I have already told how the Kaiser irritated the President by forestalling him with a German Peace Note, and how Wilson issued his own Note *German Peace* $& <ja ys jate^ fearful lest the Allies should wSson myS close the door to negotiations before he could get in his appeal to them. In face of the tenor of the German Note, arrogant and confident, which showed clearly that the only terms the Germans would contemplate would be terms based on the assumption of substantial victory already achieved by them. President Wilson's intervention emphasises his painful anxiety for peace at any price.

A further proof of the fact that President Wilson was up to the last determined not to contemplate any departure from neutrality is afforded by *Wilson's* the total lack of any sort or kind of l^ or .naval Preparation for the possible contingency of war. His view was that a messenger of peace should only be armed with an olive branch, not realising that a whole grove of olives at that stage of the War would make no impression on either side unless the combatants knew that guns were hidden by the foliage. This is the more noteworthy, since as far back as i8th April, 1916, after the sinking of the *Sussex* by a German submarine, the President had found himself compelled to address an ultimatum to Germany, in which he had declared that:—

" Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an

122*^ abandonment of its Present

methods
infident of submarine warfare
against passenger
and freight-carrying vessels, the Govern-
ment of the United States can have no
choice but